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The Fundamentals of 
Medicare Demonstrations
Amanda Cassidy, Consultant
oVerVieW — Demonstrations are experiments that test Medicare policy 
changes without permanently changing the Medicare program. They allow 
policymakers to learn about the potential impact and operational challenges 
of a proposed modification to Medicare, but in a more controlled environment 
and on a limited basis. Since demonstrations can affect hundreds of thousands 
of beneficiaries and providers and involve millions of dollars, they are often 
controversial. This paper describes the basics of Medicare demonstrations, 
including what they are, how they are initiated, and why they are undertaken. 
The paper also explores the relationship between demonstrations and other 
research projects. The primary challenges in designing and implementing 
demonstrations and how the results of demonstrations are incorporated into 
Medicare are examined. Finally, this document highlights key demonstra-
tions in Medicare history and their impact on the Medicare program.
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Medicare Demonstrations: 
Planning for the Future
Demonstrations are real-world tests of new ways of delivering health 
care services, paying health care providers, or designing benefits under 
Medicare. They act as laboratories for the Centers for Medicare & Medic-
aid Services (CMS), the federal agency that runs Medicare, to experiment 
with potential changes to the Medicare program. If these innovations 
prove their worth, Congress and the administration can make informed 
decisions about whether or not to add them to the Medicare program as 
a regular part of ongoing operations. (The Medicaid program uses waivers 
to allow for innovation in its program as well; for more information, see Cynthia 
Shirk, “Shaping Medicaid and SCHIP Through Waivers: The Fundamentals,” 
National Health Policy Forum, Background Paper 64, July 22, 2008, available at 
www.nhpf.org/pdfs_bp/BP64_MedicaidSCHIP.Waivers_07-22-08.pdf.)
an introDuction to DemonStrationS
Controversial aspects of Medicare demonstration projects are often in the 
news. By their very nature, demonstrations change the status quo of this 
very large federal program, affecting beneficiaries, providers, and Medi-
care expenditures. There is fodder for controversy in what policies are 
tested, how demonstrations are designed, which health care providers or 
beneficiaries are included or excluded, how much providers are paid, or 
how the demonstration results are interpreted and when they are made 
available. In many respects, demonstrations are a microcosm of the larger 
Medicare program—replete with influential stakeholders, political inter-
ests, taxpayer dollars, and beneficiary protection issues.
Demonstrations and the public interest that seems to follow them are not 
new to Medicare. Since the demonstration waiver authority was granted in 
1967, hundreds of demonstrations have been undertaken. Some have never 
gotten off the drawing board and others have failed to reveal better ways to 
administer the program. But many have led to some of the most important 
changes in Medicare payment and service delivery. The method Medicare 
uses to pay hospitals for inpatient care—the inpatient prospective payment 
system, or IPPS—is a prime example. Others include the skilled nursing 
facility and home health prospective payment systems; the Medicare man-
aged care program, including preferred provider organizations and special 
needs plans; durable medical equipment competitive bidding; programs 
to improve care for dual-eligible beneficiaries, such as the Program for 
All-inclusive Care for the Elderly, or PACE, and social health maintenance 
organizations, or SHMOs; the hospice benefit; and Medicare coverage for 
heart transplants. Demonstrations can also have an impact beyond the 
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Medicare program, as other payers follow Medicare’s lead in adapting their 
payment and coverage policies. The IPPS concept, for example, is now used 
by many insurers to pay for inpatient hospital services.
Most demonstrations are undertaken for one of two reasons. The first is to 
test ideas about potential broad changes to Medicare. The ability to under-
take smaller, controlled, experiments before making permanent changes 
in a program as large as Medicare helps ensure smoother transitions for 
both providers and beneficiaries. A second reason is to evaluate changes 
that are targeted to a subgroup of beneficiaries or providers who are not 
well served by the current program. In this case, a program-wide change 
may not be the right solution. A more targeted approach can be tested and 
refined through a demonstration.
Over the years, as Medicare has faced major changes in health care delivery, 
financing, or benefits, the results of demonstrations have very often informed 
the way the program is updated. Research and demonstrations have provided 
Congress and the administration with a better understanding of the policy 
tools available to address accelerating growth in health care spending, more 
information on how those tools actually work in the Medicare program, and 
an estimate of the potential results of implementing those tools program-
wide. As policymakers nervously eye the depletion of the Medicare Part A 
Trust Fund as soon as 2019, the hope is that the demonstration and research 
programs being designed and implemented now will yield policy approaches 
that can help slow the rate of growth in health spending.
DemonStration BaSicS
A demonstration is applied research that tests the effects of a new policy 
approach on Medicare beneficiaries, providers, or program expenditures. 
Demonstrations are often limited to one or several geographic areas, or 
to a particular subgroup of Medicare providers or beneficiaries. They are 
generally time-limited, commonly two years. New policy approaches most 
often involve paying for Medicare-covered services in a different way, but 
may also involve paying for items or services not otherwise paid for by 
Medicare, or allowing health care providers not otherwise providing a 
particular Medicare-covered service to do so.
Demonstrations rely on basic research studies to develop the concepts to 
be tested, the payment mechanisms to achieve them, and the measures 
by which success is evaluated. However, unlike a research project that 
does not require gathering data in the field, demonstrations actually 
affect the services provided to beneficiaries and adjust the payments to 
providers. Demonstrations allow CMS to gain real-world experience with 
the proposed changes, but in a controlled manner that provides, at their 
best, clear information on which to evaluate the innovations being tested. 
The geographic area, the providers, the beneficiary population, and/or 
the time period involved can be controlled and changes can be assessed 
before larger-scale adoption. They can provide insight into the impact of 
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a particular change as well as provide opera-
tional knowledge that may inform the agency’s 
implementation of other policy changes.
The focus of Medicare demonstrations tends 
to reflect the policy concerns of the day. In 
the 1970s, many demonstrations focused 
on controlling health care cost growth, 
including the largest component of costs at 
the time, inpatient hospital services. In the 
1980s, the majority of projects addressed 
either long-term care issues or alternative 
delivery mechanisms, such as prepaid 
health plans.1 More recent demonstration 
activity has focused on refinements of ex-
isting payment systems. Table 1 (next two 
pages) highlights examples of recent and 
upcoming demonstrations grouped into four 
categories: health care quality, alternative 
payment methods, expansion of the program 
to cover new provider types or benefits, and 
care coordination and prevention. Quality 
of care demonstrations are projects that test 
methods of collecting data on the quality of 
care provided to beneficiaries, including in-
vestments in health information technology, 
and evaluate ways to incorporate incentives 
to meet quality goals into the Medicare pay-
ment systems. Alternative payment meth-
odology demonstrations test new ways to pay providers for services to 
Medicare beneficiaries. Demonstrations that expand Medicare benefits or 
provider types evaluate the impact on the program of covering services 
that are not currently part of the Medicare benefit package. Finally, care 
coordination and prevention projects assess ways to better manage the 
care provided to beneficiaries (usually those with chronic conditions) 
to achieve better outcomes and control spending. While some recent or 
upcoming demonstrations may not fall into one of these categories, they 
are illustrative of current demonstration themes.
For simplicity, the demonstrations in Table 1 are listed by primary focus. 
However, demonstrations can, and very often do, test more than one con-
cept. For example, the Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration and the Physi-
cian Hospital Collaboration Demonstration are both quality demonstrations 
testing the impact of allowing hospitals to create incentives for physicians to 
provide more efficient and higher-quality care. (See text box.) While focused 
on quality, these projects must also consider alternative methodologies that 
would combine payments for hospitals and physicians.
The Hospital Gainsharing 
Demonstration and the Physi-
cian Hospital Collaboration 
Demonstration are testing 
incentives for physicians to provide high-quality and 
efficient care. The incentives can include allowing phy-
sicians to share in the savings that may accrue to the 
hospital, a practice referred to as “gainsharing.” Physi-
cians have significant control over the services provided 
in a hospital, but Medicare pays the physician and the 
hospital separately and on different bases for those ser-
vices: hospitals are paid a fee per case, but physicians are 
paid per service. Consequently, the financial incentives 
for the two players seem to work in opposition to one 
another: hospitals can maximize profits by reducing the 
length of patient stays, while physicians can maximize 
payments by providing more services such as patient 
visits. These two demonstrations are testing whether 
models can be developed that will better align incen-
tives for both hospitals and physicians. The goal is to 




continued on p. 8 ä
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taBle 1
examples of Demonstrations by Subject
Quality of care
Demonstration title Description 
home health 
pay for performance
Tests impact of incentive payments funded by savings from reduced use of higher-
cost services on outcome-based quality improvement measures.
care management 
performance
Experiments with giving financial incentives to physician practices to report clinical 
quality data, meet performance standards, and provide preventive services, with 




Evaluates the intermediate and longer-term impact of allowing physicians to share 
in the savings from providing more efficient inpatient care.
health care Quality Tests major changes implemented by physician practices, integrated delivery 
systems, or regional health consortia intended to improve patient safety, enhance 
quality, increase efficiency, and reduce scientific uncertainty and the unwarranted 
variation in medical practice.
premier hospital 
Quality incentive
Tests impact on quality of care of providing financial incentives to hospitals that 
demonstrate high quality in five acute care areas: heart attack, heart failure, pneu-
monia, coronary artery bypass graft, and hip and knee replacements.
physician Group 
practice
Tests impact on quality measures of providing incentive payments to physicians 
that are allocated based on cost efficiency and performance and are generated from 
coordinating care under Parts A and B of Medicare.
alternatiVe payment methoDS
Demonstration title Description
part D payment Provides alternative methods of receiving reinsurance for drug costs above the 
“catastrophic” level for Part D plans offering enhanced coverage.
evaluation of  payment 
Demonstrations for 
medicare part D
Uses alternative weighting methods for calculating the regional low-income 
benchmark.
Demonstrations 
Serving those Dually 
eligible for medicare 
and medicaid
Evaluates impact of combining Medicare and Medicaid funding pools at the health 
plan level and different approaches to managing care on expenditures and quality 
of care for dual-eligible beneficiaries.
recovery audit 
contractors
Tests the cost-effectiveness of additional resources to ensure that correct payments 
are made by Medicare.
rural community 
hospital
Tests whether reasonable cost reimbursement for certain small rural hospitals 
enhances the ability of those hospitals to meet the needs of their communities.
table 1 — continued >
national health policy forum  |  www.nhpf.org 7
Background paper – no. 63
July 22, 2008
table 1 — examples of Demonstrations by Subject  > continued
neW proViDer typeS anD / or BenefitS
Demonstration title Description 
low Vision 
rehabilitation
Allows for coverage of vision rehabilitation services by additional types of prac-




Allows payment for treatment in nonhospital settings of patients who need in-




Evaluates impact of covering hemodialysis six times a week rather than the con-
ventional frequency of three times a week.
medical adult 
Day care Services
Allows for coverage of services provided in an adult day care center as a substitute 
for some home health services.
rural hospice Evaluates the impact of waiving certain requirements for Medicare-approved 
hospice providers on access to hospice care in rural areas.




Tests the impact of disease-management/care-improvement programs on quality, 
beneficiary satisfaction, health outcomes, and cost of fee-for-service Medicare 
beneficiaries with chronic conditions.
Senior risk reduction Tests the effect on Medicare beneficiaries of health promotion and health manage-
ment approaches used in the private sector.
cancer prevention 
and treatment 
Demonstration for racial 
and ethnic minorities
Evaluates the impact on racial disparities in the screening, diagnosis and treat-
ment of cancer of providing patient navigator services, such as care coordination, 
transportation assistance, and translation services.
care management for 
high-cost Beneficiaries





Tests the effectiveness of disease management models and quality incentive pay-
ments on care for ESRD beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans that 
have partnered with dialysis facilities.
coordinated care Tests the impact on the number of hospitalizations, health status, and health care 
costs of different case and disease management approaches to coordinating care 




Evaluates use of telemedicine sessions with case managers to improve primary 
and preventative care for diabetes in underserved inner-city and rural areas of 
New York.
Source: Centers for Medicare & Mecdicaid Services (CMS), “Demonstration Projects and Evaluation Reports: Medicare Demonstra-
tions,” available at www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/MD/list.asp#TopOfPage; and CMS, “Medicare Health Support,” available 
at www.cms.hhs.gov/CCIP. 
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Demonstrations that do not achieve their primary goals also can be in-
structive. Indeed, sometimes more can be learned from failure than suc-
cess, since avoiding costly mistakes is as important as finding solutions 
that clearly work. Ideas that do not produce expected results encourage 
policymakers to seek other solutions or to reassess how a policy could be 
implemented. For example, by the end of 2008 CMS will complete a high-
profile pilot, Medicare Health Support, that has been testing methods of 
managing care for chronically ill beneficiaries.2 Preliminary evaluations of 
the project found that the Medicare program was not saving money, the op-
portunity for long-term Medicare savings was not evident, and there were 
only modest effects on clinical quality indicators, beneficiary compliance, 
and self care activities.3 Despite the apparent lack of the hoped-for results, 
the final evaluation likely will yield useful insights for future work.
Responsibility for overseeing demonstration projects within CMS is handled 
primarily by the Office of Research, Development, and Information.4 This of-
fice also is responsible for developing and implementing the agency’s broader 
research agenda. CMS relies on research funding to help design, implement, 
and evaluate demonstration projects. It also uses research contracts for 
other purposes, including gathering and interpreting data and providing 
analytical, actuarial, or technical support for CMS activities. A report list-
ing the hundreds of research, demonstration, and evaluation projects CMS 
manages each year is available on the the agency’s Web site.5
the connection BetWeen  
DemonStrationS anD reSearch
When considering how to evaluate a potential policy option, CMS or 
Congress may choose to conduct research, undertake a demonstration, or 
both. Research is generally a data-driven enterprise: data are analyzed to 
shed light on the policy being evaluated. In general, if sufficient data exist 
to examine an issue, policymakers will choose research over a demonstra-
tion since it can be less expensive, less complicated, quicker, and avoids 
changing the status quo for beneficiaries and providers.
Demonstrations are applied research: they change how Medicare operates 
in a geographic area or for a particular group of beneficiaries. Demonstra-
tions most often require some level of research to support their develop-
ment and to evaluate their results. Indeed, research can be undertaken 
without conducting a demonstration, but a demonstration cannot be 
undertaken without supporting it with research. Before implementing a 
demonstration, CMS uses research to develop and test the methodology 
and measures to be used. After a demonstration is completed, an evalua-
tion assesses the impact of the project.
The combination of research and demonstrations has been vital to past 
Medicare reforms. One of the most fundamental changes in the Medicare 
continued from p. 5
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program’s history was the shift from cost-based payment to prospective 
payment for inpatient hospital services. In developing the IPPS, CMS 
(then the Health Care Financing Administration, or HCFA) engaged 
in research studies on many technical aspects of the payment system, 
including measures of patients’ severity of illness and differences in 
hospital wages and other costs. The agency also conducted multiple 
demonstrations of key concepts (see text box below for a history of the 
use of demonstrations in the development of the IPPS). The development 
Development of the hospital inpatient prospective payment System (iPPs)
The development of the IPPS is classic Medicare 
demonstration work. The prospective payment 
demonstration projects identified viable alterna-
tives to cost-based reimbursement and winnowed 
out unworkable approaches.
From 1965 until October 1983, hospitals were paid 
based on their stated costs of providing care. This 
methodology encouraged hospital participation 
in the Medicare program but gave providers little 
incentive to increase efficiency or reduce costs. If 
a hospital’s costs increased, Medicare’s payments 
to that hospital went up. Projects to identify alter-
native approaches to cost reimbursement began 
in 1974. The first demonstrations were budget 
review programs conducted in Rhode Island, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina that allowed 
payers to prospectively negotiate hospital bud-
gets. While these projects encouraged payers to 
focus on cost differences between hospitals, they 
quickly showed that each side in the negotiations 
had a different understanding of the meaning of 
prospective payment, and both payers and hos-
pitals sought retroactive payment adjustments 
to reduce their own risk. Within a year, budget 
review programs were rejected as impractical for 
the Medicare program as a whole.
Pursuit of other alternatives continued through the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. A request for proposal 
(RFP) released in 1975 resulted in awards to vari-
ous state agencies and Blue Cross organizations 
to test different approaches. These projects were 
undertaken in Washington, New York, Massachu-
setts, Georgia, and New Jersey. The project with 
the most significant impact was in New Jersey. 
It experimented with prospectively set payment 
rates for patients classified with clinically similar 
patients into diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). The 
IPPS adopted in 1983 closely resembled the New 
Jersey model in that both used payments based on 
DRGs, and both were systems in which the pay-
ment rates were indexed for future inflation. 
By 1983, more than 10 years of research and dem-
onstrations related to hospital prospective pay-
ment allowed HCFA to identify features it wanted 
to include as well as to avoid in a prospective pay-
ment system.  Demonstration experience showed 
that the system needed to account for differences 
in patient severity or case-mix, minimize the need 
for retroactive adjustments, and maximize incen-
tives to control costs. The DRG-based system was 
determined to best meet these needs, and within 
the first year it exceeded expectations for reducing 
length of stay and extended the solvency of the 
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund by a decade.
Source: Alfonso Esposito, “Medicare’s Prospective Payment Demonstration Program,” in Diagnosis-Related Groups: The Effect in New Jersey, 
The Potential for the Nation, HCFA Pub. No. 03170, proceedings of a conference sponsored jointly by the New Jersey Department of Health and 
the Health Care Financing Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Atlantic City, NJ, November 30–December 2, 1983, pp. 
18–24; Allen Dobson et al., “The Future of Medicare Policy Reform: Priorities for Research and Demonstrations,” Health Care Financing Review, 
1986 Annual Supplement, pp. 1–3.
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of the prospective payment systems for skilled nursing facilities and home 
health agencies also relied on both research and demonstrations. In con-
trast, development of the physician fee schedule involved research studies 
on key aspects of the system, but the fee schedule methodology as a whole 
was not tested under a demonstration project.6 Although not always tested 
under demonstrations, research funding was used to develop essential 
elements of most Medicare payment systems, including the patient clas-
sification systems such as resource utilization groups for skilled nursing 
facilities and ambulatory payment classifications for hospital outpatient 
departments; the risk-adjustment model for Medicare Advantage; and the 
resource-based relative value scale for physician services.
In order to respond rapidly to research needs, CMS establishes base 
contracts with firms able to perform analyses of Medicare, Medicaid, 
and SCHIP issues. These contracts are generally for research, analysis, 
demonstration evaluation and survey activities, and are activated through 
“task orders”—competitive procurements for specific projects that are open 
only to firms that have been awarded base contracts—as CMS identifies 
specific research requirements. 
CMS’s research budget must accommodate both research studies and 
contracts to design and evaluate demonstrations. While the number of 
payment systems and Medicare expenditures continues to grow, the CMS 
research budget has declined in recent years, from a high of $138 million in 
fiscal year (FY) 2001 to a low of roughly $47 million in FY 2008.7 (See Figure 
1 on next page and Appendix on p. 26.) Some have suggested that current 
funding is insufficient to ensure that policymakers have an adequate stock 
of tested ideas for the future.
initiation of meDicare DemonStrationS
Both Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
usually acting through CMS, may initiate Medicare demonstration projects. 
The distribution of congressionally mandated and CMS-initiated projects 
has varied over time. In the early 1980s, few projects were mandated by 
Congress. This changed over the next decade and congressionally man-
dated demonstrations became the majority.8 In January 2008, about 60 per-
cent of the 31 current or upcoming demonstrations listed on the agency’s 
Web site were legislated by Congress.9
congressional mandates
Congress may mandate particular projects or studies when it enacts leg-
islation. By mandating a research study or demonstration, Congress can 
test a policy approach or idea that may be premature or inappropriate to 
implement on a program-wide basis. Requiring demonstrations or other 
research projects signals congressional interest in an area and specifies 
continued on p. 12 ä
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cmS research Budget fy 2000 – fy 2009
cMs’s total research budget has lacked stability 
over the years, making planning for future research 
projects challenging. the research budget has been 
cut from a high of $138.3 million in FY 2001 to 
$46.9 million in FY 2008. the President’s FY 2009 
budget proposed a further reduction.
cmS research Budget as a percentage 
of program management Budget 
fy 2000 – fy 2009
since FY 2001, the cMs research budget has been 
declining as a percentage of cMs’s program manage-
ment budget, from a high of 6.2 percent in FY 2001 
to a low of 1.4 percent in FY 2008. the President’s FY 
2009 budget proposed lowering the percentage to 
1.1 percent. note: the program management budget 
is appropriated annually to carry out the day-to-day 
management of cMs functions.
fy 2008 cmS total research Budget: 
Breakdown of Spending
only about half of the total research budget 
is actually available for new or ongoing projects. 
For FY 2008, about half of the total research bud-
get was reserved for congressional earmarks, real 
choice systems change grants, and execution of 
the Medicare current Beneficiary survey.
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Fiscal Year
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2008 TOTAL RESEARCH BUDGET = $46.9 million
[Budget breakdown in millions of dollars]
fiGure 1: cmS research and Demonstration funding, fy 2000 – fy 2009
Note: See Appendix (p. 26) for more information on research and demonstration funding.
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees,” available at www.hhs.gov/
budget/docbudget.htm; Centers for Medicare & Mecdicaid Services, staff communication with author, April 2008.
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topics on which members believe they need more information. In par-
ticular, mandated projects can reflect the concerns and future agenda 
of the Senate Finance, House Ways and Means, and House Energy and 
Commerce Committees, the three authorizing committees that have 
specific jurisdiction over the Medicare program. Congressional appetite 
for demonstrations and reports is great. For example, in the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), 
Congress mandated 14 demonstrations and requested over 100 reports to 
Congress on specific research, implementation of various initiatives, and 
evaluations of required demonstrations from HHS, the Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO), the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC), and the Institute of Medicine.
Rather than enacting discrete legislation for demon-
strations, the Medicare authorizing committees most 
often include them in bills that incorporate more exten-
sive changes to the program. Since the authorization 
for many demonstrations specifies budget neutrality 
(that is, they cannot increase Medicare spending), they typically do not 
increase the cost of the overall bill and, therefore, spark little opposition by 
the members. Also, because the demonstrations are not permanent parts of 
the program, the language authorizing them is often not incorporated into 
the Social Security Act; it is found only in the statute that is being enacted 
(the MMA, for example). Tracking congressional action on demonstrations 
and any changes to the statutory authority can be difficult, since not all 
of the language related to a particular demonstration can necessarily be 
found in one place.
Congressionally mandated demonstrations are sometimes the result of a 
political compromise when not all parties can agree on a particular leg-
islative provision. Demonstrations also can jumpstart interest in a policy 
solution, sometimes moving forward a compelling but yet unproven ap-
proach.10 They can also act as a pressure valve for controversial ideas that 
are argued to have merit but may lack widespread support or evidence 
of their effectiveness for Medicare nationally. For example, some mem-
bers of Congress have advocated introducing more competition into the 
determination of Medicare payment rates, especially when the program 
purchases discrete goods and services, such as durable medical equip-
ment (DME) and clinical laboratory services. However, legislators are far 
from agreement on this proposal. A demonstration testing competitive 
bidding in limited markets for DME showed it could result in program 
savings, and the MMA mandated competitive acquisition of DME in more 
areas. Still, the concept remains a topic of debate, and the MMA did not 
require its use for additional services. Instead, the legislation mandated 
another demonstration applying the same techniques to clinical labora-
tory services and creating a voluntary competitive acquisition program 
congressionally mandated demon-
strations are sometimes the result of 
political compromise.
continued from p. 10
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for certain prescription drugs delivered in physician offices and paid for 
under Medicare Part B. Most recently, Congress delayed implementation 
of competitive acquisition for DME and repealed the clinical laboratory 
competitive bidding demonstration in the Medicare Improvements for 
Patients and Providers Act of 2008.
Congress also mandates demonstrations in response to the needs of par-
ticular constituencies. For example, many members of Congress represent 
rural areas and are interested in supporting access to care for rural ben-
eficiaries. Reflecting this interest, the MMA 
included three demonstrations on rural health 
issues. The Rural Hospice project evaluates the 
impact of waiving particular requirements 
for Medicare-approved hospice providers 
on access to hospice care in rural areas; the 
Rural Community Hospital Demonstration tests whether reasonable cost 
reimbursement for certain small rural hospitals enhances the ability of 
those hospitals to meet the needs of their communities; and the Frontier 
Extended Stay Clinic Demonstration allows payment for care of patients 
in nonhospital settings who need inpatient care but cannot be transferred 
to an inpatient facility because of weather or other circumstances.
The House and Senate appropriations committees also seek to influence 
the selection and implementation of Medicare projects. The appropria-
tions committees may encourage CMS to undertake certain projects by 
indicating their support in the conference report accompanying the 
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations bill. 
Although report language does not have the same weight as a statutory 
mandate, CMS pays careful attention to recommendations on the use of 
research funding included in any appropriations bill report. Appropria-
tors can be extremely specific in identifying their preferred projects, 
commonly referred to as “earmarks.” Appropriations bills have also 
included language that prohibits CMS from spending money to imple-
ment certain demonstrations, thereby delaying or possibly ending a 
demonstration. Such action can be seen as infringing on the jurisdiction 
of the authorizing committees, which, by the rules of the House and 
Senate, have responsibility for handling the substantive policy issues 
facing the program.11
In addition to requiring new projects or studies, Congress may choose to 
extend existing projects (whether statutorily mandated or initiated by CMS) 
beyond their original time frame. In particular, Congress may act when a 
demonstration enjoys strong support from the providers or beneficiaries 
involved but expansion of the concept being tested is unlikely because, for 
example, savings goals were not reached. In the case of the Municipal Health 
Services Demonstration, Congress acted eight times to extend the project. 
This demonstration tested whether or not elimination of copayments and de-
ductibles, and offering incentives such as eyeglasses and prescription drugs) 
cmS pays careful attention to recommenda-
tions on the use of research funding included 
in any appropriations bill report.
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at municipal health centers could reduce utilization of hospital inpatient 
and emergency department services. Begun in 1978, the demonstration ran 
through 2006, well beyond its original timeframe of five years.12
hhS initiatives
HHS has authority to initiate demonstration projects under section 402 of 
the Social Security Amendments of 1967. The section 402 authority allows 
the Secretary of HHS to determine whether efficiency or economy of health 
services is increased if changes are made in the method of payment or if 
services are covered other than those for which payment may already be 
made under Medicare.13 Statutory authority limits CMS-initiated demon-
strations to changes in methods of payment.
CMS can use its demonstration authority to signal the administration’s 
intent to pursue a particular approach without waiting for the legislative 
process to produce a congressional mandate. For example, using demon-
stration projects that gathered voluntarily provided performance data, 
CMS laid the groundwork for quality incentive programs that reward 
physicians and providers for meeting performance goals. Congress then 
built on those initiatives and provided for payment adjustments to hospitals 
and physicians who participated.14
Since they lack a congressional directive, projects initiated under this au-
thority may be subject to more intense scrutiny by Congress and other ob-
servers such as MedPAC and GAO. Questions may be raised as to whether 
such demonstrations appropriately exercise the section 402 authority and 
whether the program and administrative resources needed to adminis-
ter the demonstration were properly used. Recent CMS demonstrations 
under Part D and for oncology services under Part B are not limited to a 
specific geographic area but rather adjust payments nationally for certain 
plans or services. Under the Part D demonstrations, CMS changed the 
methodology for calculating the Part D premium for low-income benefi-
ciaries and allowed all prescription drug plan sponsors who intended to 
offer supplemental drug benefits to choose an alternative to the standard 
method for determining when a beneficiary would qualify for catastrophic 
coverage. Under the oncology demonstration, Medicare made an additional 
payment to oncologists for submitting quality of life or patient care data. 
CMS has been criticized for these atypical demonstrations, which are seen 
as attempts to use the demonstration authority to make widespread pay-
ment or policy adjustments without intending to gather data to explore a 
particular policy option.15
In addition to the demonstration authority, section 1110 of the Social Security 
Act provides the Secretary with the authority to make grants that pay for 
research projects to improve the administration and effectiveness of CMS 
programs, including Medicare. Grants CMS has funded in the past include 
unsolicited projects that are suggested by the public. However, the agency 
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notes that there has been a sharp reduction in research grants in recent 
years, and unsolicited proposals are unlikely to be funded.16 
Key iSSueS
There are a number of key issues to consider in designing, implementing, 
and evaluating Medicare demonstrations.
time required
Designing and implementing demonstrations is a multistep process that 
can take from months to years to complete. First, a demonstration model is 
developed by CMS staff with input from experts on the relevant subject. The 
input may be through informal consultation, advisory panels, or a formal 
federal contract for development design. The design 
must incorporate the data needs of the project’s evalu-
ation as well as address how the Medicare claims pro-
cessing systems will be able to identify and correctly 
process claims under the demonstration model. CMS 
must work with HHS and OMB staff to get approval 
for the proposed project. The public is then notified of the demonstration 
and participants recruited through a notice in the Federal Register and on the 
CMS Web site, a press release, outreach to relevant provider organizations, 
or mailings to potential applicants. Demonstration participants (health care 
providers and/or beneficiaries) are selected, consistent with the require-
ments of the demonstration, and the participants are given adequate lead 
time to plan for and implement the demonstration. The demonstration 
then is operational for a period of between one and five years, depending 
on the mandate and study design. Interim evaluations may be conducted 
during the demonstration, and an overall evaluation is conducted after the 
demonstration is completed. A one-year demonstration typically takes at 
least three years to complete, with one year for design and solicitation of 
participants, one year for operation, and one year for evaluation.17 Many 
demonstrations also involve a refinement stage, in which results are used 
to refine policies or operational aspects to further hone the policy or how it 
is implemented. Figure 2 (next page), highlights the life cycle of three major 
demonstrations: IPPS, skilled nursing facility prospective payment system, 
and competitive bidding for durable medical equipment.
As Figure 2 indicates, significant lead time often is necessary to adequately 
research, design, implement, and evaluate a demonstration. The time 
required to carry out a demonstration may offset the usefulness of the 
lessons learned through the project. For example, Section 623 of the MMA 
mandated a report to Congress on a bundled payment system for end-stage 
renal disease as well as a three-year demonstration of the concept. In its 
report, CMS noted the delay the demonstration would cause in implement-
ing a national bundled payment system and cited reasons that running the 
demonstration concurrent with implementing a bundled system would be 
Designing and implementing demonstra-
tions is a multistep process that can take 
from months to years to complete.
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inappropriate. As an alternative, the agency has suggested going ahead 
with a national system without the demonstration and monitoring the 
experience of beneficiaries and providers.18 Given the need for tested ideas 
as policymakers consider proposals to avoid exhaustion of the Medicare 
Part A Trust Fund in 2019 and the relatively long lead time necessary to 
undertake demonstrations, some experts believe that current investments 
in research and demonstrations are insufficient.
changes to the Status Quo
There is no disputing that demonstrations upset the status quo. CMS uses 
its demonstration authority to waive specific provisions of law or regula-
tion to pay a subset of providers or organizations differently from other 
like providers or organizations in order to test a program innovation and 
evaluate the results. Although the Medicare waiver authority has not gen-
erally been used to make the broad changes that are permitted under the 
Medicaid waiver authority,19 by their very nature Medicare demonstrations 
require payment policies that are different from the Medicare standard.
Demonstrations may cause controversy because, while some providers or 
beneficiaries may benefit from the approach being tested, others may be 
adversely affected (or fear being adversely affected). In some instances, 
Congress has put additional requirements on or even prevented implemen-
tation of controversial demonstrations. For example, in the BBA, Congress 
mandated a competitive bidding demonstration for managed care plans 
fiGure 2: life cycle of Demonstrations: research, Demonstration, and refinement phases
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* Durable Medical Equipment was originally scheduled to be implemented July 1, 2008 but was delayed 18 months by the Medicare Improve-
ments for Patients and Providers Act of 2008.
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Master Demonstration, Evaluation and Research Studies System of Record Project List found 
at www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts; and CMS staff communication with the author, July 2008.
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after unsuccessful attempts to implement HCFA-initiated demonstrations 
in Baltimore and Denver. Following objection by local plans and provid-
ers in Kansas City and Phoenix, the two sites selected for the mandated 
demonstration, Congress delayed the project and placed additional re-
quirements for its implementation, effectively ending the demonstration.20 
In other instances, the courts have been asked to intervene to determine 
whether a demonstration is an appropriate use of CMS or congressional 
authority or whether processes for awarding contracts are correct. For 
example, a permanent injunction in April 2004 halted activity on a gain-
sharing demonstration in New Jersey after the court determined that 
CMS did not have authority to waive civil monetary penalties as needed 
to permit gainsharing.21 Congress later provided explicit authority for a 
similar demonstration in the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act. More recently, in 
April 2008, a federal court issued a preliminary injunction halting imple-
mentation of the clinical laboratory competitive bidding demonstration 
in San Diego because HHS had not gone through the rulemaking process 
in designing the demonstration.
CMS attempts to mitigate the negative impact of demonstrations on benefi-
ciaries, if possible. For example, in the DME competitive bidding demon-
stration, CMS included an ombudsman who responded to questions and 
investigated complaints from beneficiaries, physicians, and suppliers. In 
the hospital gainsharing demonstration, CMS has instituted continuous 
monitoring to ensure that the quality of care provided to beneficiaries 
under the demonstration is not compromised.
Whatever the difficulty of incorporating change through a demonstration 
project, it pales in comparison to upsetting the status quo in the Medicare 
program as a whole. By identifying necessary refinements to or limitations 
of an approach before it affects beneficiaries and providers nationwide, CMS 
hopes to reduce the inevitable turmoil associated with such change.
Budget neutrality
Congress requires most mandated demonstrations to be budget neutral, 
which means that the demonstration must be designed so that total benefit 
payments under the demonstration are expected to be no more than expen-
ditures would be under the existing payment or coverage requirements. 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approval authority for 
both mandated and CMS-initiated demonstrations and requires CMS-
initiated projects to be budget neutral. 22 Some demonstrations are actu-
ally required to show a reduction in program expenditures. For example, 
participating organizations in the Disease Management Demonstration 
mandated by Section 121 of the Benefit Improvement and Protection Act of 
2000 (BIPA) were required by law to reduce Medicare spending, although 
no specific savings target was mandated. CMS also sought program savings 
under the Medicare Health Support projects but revised the targets to be 
budget neutral when anticipated savings did not occur.
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The method of reaching budget neutrality varies from demonstration to 
demonstration, depending on design, and must be approved by OMB. In 
some cases, the participating health care providers or organizations agree 
to put a portion of their payments at risk to ensure that the project does not 
increase spending. The BIPA Disease Management demonstration covered 
both disease management services and prescription drug costs (prior to 
the existence of Medicare Part D), and participating organizations had to 
assume the risk if the project did not reduce Medicare expenditures.23 Such 
an approach is relatively rare and can be a disincentive for providers or 
organizations to participate.
Demonstrations are typically designed to offset anticipated costs with 
anticipated savings. Assumptions of costs and savings are based on 
available evidence, which may be limited, particularly for the savings as-
sumptions. The implication of failing to achieve assumed savings varies 
among demonstrations. In some cases, such as the Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration and the Home Health Pay for Performance Demonstration, 
incentive payments included in the demonstration design are not awarded 
if the participating organization does not generate sufficient savings. In 
other cases, increased payments under the demonstration are offset by 
reducing payments for the type of provider nationally. The Expansion of 
Coverage of Chiropractic Services Demonstration mandated by Section 651 
of the MMA allowed coverage in four sites for services that chiropractors 
could provide under their licensure but which had not previously been 
covered by Medicare. The demonstration tested whether coverage of 
such services would reduce Medicare spending on other services, such as 
hospital or physician care. The law requires that expenditures under the 
demonstration not exceed what expenditures would have been without 
the demonstration. If the demonstration is shown to increase spending 
over its two-year duration, payments for all chiropractor services nation-
ally will be reduced to make up the difference.24
In many instances, though, higher-than-expected costs or lower-than-
expected savings under a demonstration are not recouped. Instead, such 
experience is considered during the evaluation of the project and the 
decision about whether to adopt the proposed approach more widely. In 
developing the Medicare Health Support program, for example, CMS es-
tablished a five percent savings threshold for participating organizations 
in the pilot phase of the program. As noted, participants had difficulty 
achieving the target savings and asked that the standard be adjusted to be 
budget neutral. Ultimately though, according to CMS, costs for the projects 
were between 5 percent and 11 percent greater than they would have been, 
absent the intervention. CMS is ending the current projects as scheduled 
and will determine whether to exercise its authority to implement a second 
phase of the project following completion of the Phase I evaluation.25
When estimating budget neutrality for a demonstration, CMS typically 
looks at total expenditures, not just payments for a certain type of provider. 
Additional expenditures on a specific provider or supplier type may be 
Demonstrations are 
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expected to be offset by reduced expenditures in other areas, allowing 
the demonstration to meet the requirements for budget neutrality. Such a 
calculation cannot occur under most Medicare payment systems, which 
are required to be budget neutral within the payments for a specific type 
of provider. For example, increased spending on physicians for certain 
services that may reduce expenditures on inpatient hospital care must 
be offset by reduction in payment for other 
services under the physician fee schedule, 
without consideration of the reduced inpatient 
spending. However, the current application of 
budget neutrality has also been criticized for 
its narrowness. The calculation of whether a 
project is budget neutral is determined from results over the relatively 
short duration of the demonstration and therefore does not account for 
potential long-term savings from some interventions. In addition, budget 
neutrality does not generally recognize savings to other federally funded 
programs, including Medicaid, and it does not take into consideration the 
quality of the services being purchased.26
Voluntary provider and Beneficiary participation
Generally voluntary in nature, demonstrations are collaborations between 
CMS, health care providers, suppliers and organizations, and Medicare 
beneficiaries. CMS designs a project and hopes that practitioners, provid-
ers, and plans as well as beneficiaries will want to participate. In some 
instances, such as the disease management demonstrations, the demonstra-
tion organizations recruit from pools of eligible beneficiaries to identify 
participants. In other cases, such as the Acute Care Episode Demonstration, 
selected hospitals are paid under the demonstration for all beneficiaries 
treated at the hospital who meet the demonstration qualifications and must 
only notify beneficiaries of the hospital’s participation in the demonstra-
tion. Competitive bidding demonstrations, such as those for health plans, 
durable medical equipment, and laboratory services, are the exception 
to the voluntary nature of demonstrations. These typically require that 
beneficiaries within the geographic area of the demonstration purchase 
items or services only from the suppliers selected for participation in the 
project. Some demonstrations have not been fully implemented because 
plans or providers have not wanted to offer the services provided under 
the demonstration or because beneficiary enrollment has been limited. For 
example, the Medical Savings Account demonstration was designed to test 
a new product that would combine a high-deductible health plan with a 
personal health account to be used for out-of-pocket costs, but organiza-
tion initially was willing to offer the product.27 The Lifestyle Modification 
Demonstration sought to test the impact of programs including intense 
nutrition and stress-reduction interventions on beneficiaries with moderate 
to severe coronary artery disease. Although the project included 16 sites, 
fewer than 600 beneficiaries enrolled over six years.28
Demonstrations are collaborations between 
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evaluation
Most mandated demonstrations require an evaluation and report to 
Congress on recommendations regarding the proposed approach. CMS 
also evaluates agency-initiated demonstrations. The agency contracts out 
evaluation reports through task order contracts with research firms, and 
the evaluation design is often developed at the same time the demonstra-
tion itself is being developed.
Evaluators strive for the highest quality research design in assessing dem-
onstrations, with comparability between experimental and control groups 
and sufficient data to control for other factors that may affect outcomes. 
However, designing and implementing such a study can be expensive 
and time-consuming.29 The dynamic nature of demonstrations can also 
complicate such an evaluation, which is designed to gather data from 
a specific experiment with a particular design. If the demonstration is 
adapted to respond to unanticipated events, the data gathered change and 
the evaluation must adapt, potentially causing further delays in analyzing 
and reporting on the effects of the demonstration.30
Not all demonstration evaluations reach this exacting standard in their 
design. Isolating the specific impact of multiple (and often simultaneous) 
interventions can be difficult, if not impossible. There is also a tension 
between the desire for comprehensive evaluations that take into consid-
eration a range of impacts, including the long-term effects of a change, 
and the need to produce timely and meaningful results. Observers have 
suggested ways to accelerate the evaluation process, including continu-
ous monitoring of demonstration projects or use of alternative models 
that allow rapid-cycle feedback on change to expedite incorporation of 
demonstration findings into consideration of policy changes.31 CMS has 
recently incorporated some of these approaches into its evaluation of the 
disease management demonstrations.
incorporation of reSultS into meDicare
While designing, implementing, and evaluating demonstrations often can 
be a challenge for CMS, providers, and beneficiaries, few contest that the 
research, policy, and operational knowledge gained is worth the effort. 
Former HCFA officials have bluntly stated the value of demonstrations 
in an article on the agency’s experience with the competitive bidding 
demonstration: “We know that it is difficult to change Medicare, but it is 
worse to do so without testing new ideas.”32 A major hurdle in modify-
ing Medicare can be the lack of a mechanism, other than a change in the 
statute, for incorporating successful demonstration approaches into the 
program nationwide.
In some instances, the demonstration project provides evidence that 
can be utilized in the Medicare coverage process to determine what 
treatments are medically reasonable and necessary. These instances, 
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such as the Lifestyle Modification Demonstration, are relatively rare, 
however, since the treatment being evaluated must be coverable under 
existing Medicare law. There is often no mechanism that allows CMS to 
apply more broadly many of its findings from demonstrations. While the 
administration can include proposals in the President’s budget to incorpo-
rate successful approaches into the program, Congress must act for most 
payment or coverage changes to be adopted. An exception is Medicare 
Health Support, which Congress authorized the Secretary to implement in 
two phases. Although it appears unlikely from preliminary indications, if 
the evaluation following the first phase indicates that the program met the 
conditions of improving quality of care and beneficiary satisfaction and 
reached savings targets, the Secretary is required to expand geographic 
implementation of the program and could implement it on a national basis 
without further action from Congress.
Without a mechanism for incorporation into the larger program, demon-
strations can frustrate proponents of an approach who are skeptical that 
their idea will be more generally utilized.33 Even when Congress acts in 
a prompt fashion in response to demonstration findings, the process of 
incorporating input from demonstrations into the program can be lengthy. 
For example, more than ten years passed between the time the competi-
tive bid demonstration was mandated by the BBA and implementation of 
competitive acquisition for DME (Figure 3).
As noted, the time required to complete and assess a demonstration often 
does not keep pace with congressional demands for making program 
changes. As the DME competitive acquisition timeline shows, Congress 
does not always wait for the demonstration evaluations to be completed 
before acting. In some instances, Congress has adopted approaches be-
ing tested under demonstrations before those demonstrations have even 
been fully operational, much less evaluated. For example, the Medicare 
Choices Demonstration tested methods for offering new types of man-
aged care products under Medicare and alternative risk-based payments 
BBA — Balanced Budget Act of 1997
DME — Durable Medical Equipment
MMA — Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act 
of 2003
*Originally scheduled to be implemented July 
1, 2008 but was delayed 18 months by the 
Medicare Improvements for Patients and 
Providers Act of 2008.
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS), “First Annual Report to 
Congress: Evaluation of Medicare’s Com-
petitive Bidding Demonstration For Durable 
Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, 
and Supplies,” November 30, 2000, and CMS, 
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for managed care. The earliest enrollment in a plan under the demonstra-
tion was in February 1997, with most enrollment beginning in spring and 
summer of that year. However, when Congress passed the BBA in August 
1997, it adopted for the larger Medicare managed care program many of 
the methods being tested under the Choices demonstration.34
Even absent an incorporating mechanism, demonstrations still provide 
CMS with valuable operational experience that can often be applied in 
other instances. And the issues faced in implementing and evaluating 
a project may continue to be relevant as future demonstrations are de-
veloped. For example, the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center 
Demonstration was completed in 1996 and showed that the design, which 
made a global payment for both hospital and physician care for coronary 
artery bypass graft surgery, could reduce costs and improve quality. 
However, participating hospitals did not see an anticipated increase in 
their market share and the concept was shelved. Interest in this idea has 
been renewed and CMS is soliciting participants for a related project, the 
Acute Care Episode Demonstration, that incorporates competitive bidding 
into the design.35
Over time, demonstration projects have shifted from broad experiments 
in restructuring the way the Medicare program pays for services to more 
subtle refinements of those restructured payment systems. No matter the 
specific focus, the overall goal of demonstration projects is to provide 
congressional and administration policymakers with the tools they need 
to update and improve the Medicare program. Concern that projects may 
not be meeting this overarching goal has been fairly constant over the 
history of demonstrations. In 1980, the House Ways and Means Subcom-
mittee on Oversight held a hearing on the relevance and usefulness of the 
Medicare research and demonstrations projects, the timeliness of reports 
and feedback to Congress on those projects, the quality of the evaluation 
of demonstration projects, and the dissemination of demonstration re-
sults.36 Members emphasized that the issues in this hearing were similar 
to those raised in a 1976 hearing,37 and similar complaints about Medicare 
demonstrations are heard today.38
The frustration with demonstration projects occurs in part because of the 
complexity of the issues involved and the importance of resolving the 
ongoing dilemmas in Medicare. Congress needs assistance to identify solu-
tions for these problems and expects demonstration projects to expand its 
knowledge in a meaningful way. However, as the saying goes, “hindsight 
is 20/20.” It is easier to identify projects that are not productive after the 
fact than before they are implemented. It can also be difficult to identify 
which project will be the most successful or important until many years 
after the project is completed and the innovations are incorporated into 
Medicare. The 1980 Subcommitte on Oversight hearing, for example, oc-
curred at the same time that the demonstrations leading to the IPPS were 
getting under way.
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concluSion
Medicare’s coverage and payment policies not only apply to the care 
received by the program’s 44 million beneficiaries but also are often the 
standard other insurers use to determine their own coverage and payment 
practices. Changes to Medicare policies therefore can have a significant and 
far-ranging impact on health care practice, payment, and administration 
in the United States. Changes to the program can also affect Medicare’s 
total spending, which in turn affects the funds available for other national 
spending priorities. Research and demonstrations allow CMS and Con-
gress to explore the application of new ideas to Medicare in a targeted 
manner. Absent these mechanisms, changes would be made on a much 
larger scale, and the whole program and its beneficiaries would face the 
ups and downs of refining the new approach. However, significant lead 
time is required to design, implement, evaluate, and refine demonstrations. 
Having results available when they are needed requires both forethought 
and funding. In looking for tools to sustain, update, and improve Medicare 
in the future, Congress will turn to the results of demonstrations to inform 
their deliberations. The more robust, timely, and innovative demonstration 
projects are, the better prepared Congress will be to consider potential 
changes to Medicare.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
research and  
Demonstrations
$   40.3 $   39.6 $  42.3 $  15.5 $  41.5 $  44.7 $   31.1 $  23.4 $  25.0 $  14.4 
congressional  
earmarks 10.3 37.3 22.9 5.8 17.1 12.7 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 
real choice Systems 
change Grants 0.0 50.0 40.0 40.0 39.5 39.7 24.7 15.9 9.8 7.5 
medicare current  
Beneficiary Survey 11.2 11.4 12.0 12.4 13.4 13.1 13.6 18.4 7.2 14.4 
total reSearch $   61.8 $ 138.3 $ 117.2 $  73.7 $ 111.5 $ 110.2 $  69.4 $  57.7 $  46.9 $  36.3 
appenDix
cmS research Budget, fy 2000 to proposed fy 2009 (in millions of dollars) 
Note: Includes funds from the CMS Research Appropriation and selected sections of additional legislation such 
as the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003; the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005; the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006; and the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007. 
Funds in the Quality Improvement Organization budget and Informational Technology systems changes that 
support research and demonstration activities are not included. Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey funding is 
lower in FY 2008 due to forward funding in FY 2007 and partial year funding in 2008.
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Commit-
tees,” available at www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm; CMS, staff communication with author, April 2008.
* President’s proposed  
FY 2009 budget.
A congressional earmark is a dem-
onstration or research project with 
a funding amount appropriated in 
the statute. Generally, an earmarked 
project is unique to a particular 
participant or geographic area.
